Patricia L. Dayton v. Douglas D. Dayton : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Patricia L. Dayton v. Douglas D. Dayton : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roy D. Cole; Attorney for Defendant.
Robert A. Echard; Robert Echard and Associates; Attorney for Plaintiff.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dayton v. Dayton, No. 20010889 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3542
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA L.DAYTON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
DOUGLAS D. DAYTON 
Defendant/Appellee 
CaseNo.20010889-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of divorce, in the Second Judicial District Court in and 
for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, Judge, presiding. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD (953) 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ROYD.COLE(A8515) 
2605 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA L. DAYTON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
v. : 
DOUGLAS D. DAYTON : Case No. 20010889-CA 
Defendant/Appellee : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of divorce, in the Second Judicial District Court in 
for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, Judge, presiding 
ROYD.COLE(A8515) 
2605 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ROBERT A. ECHARD (953) 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
I 'AMI I I P I CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
SIAIEMENI ul< Tlll< ISSUI'S, STANhAKhul''KliVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAi. COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
SET ASIDE A MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO ON THE RECORD 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EQUALLY DIVIDING THE MARITAL 
ASSETS 13 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
DIVIDED THE DAYTON MARITAL ESTATE IN A GROSSLY 
DISPROPORTIONATE MANNER 16 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
PUNISHED THE APPELLANT BY AWARDING HER ONLY 9% OF THE 
MARITAL ASSETS 22 
. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DID NOT ASSIGN 
VALUES TO EACH ITEM OF DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY 24 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
DID NOT AWARD THE APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FEES AND COURT 
COSTS 25 
i 
A. The Appellant Has Substantial Financial Need to Justify Awarding 
Attorneys Fees and Costs. 26 
B. The Appellee Has Substantial Assets to Pay for Appellants Attorneys 
Fees and Costs. 27 
C. The Trial Court Failed to Make Any Determination on the 
Reasonableness of Attorneys Fees and Costs. 28 
D. The Appellant should be awarded attorneys fees because she prevailed 
on the issues of child custody, child support and alimony. 28 
CONCLUSION 30 
Addendum A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Addendum B: Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 
Addendum C: Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 
Addendum D: Schedule B Property Evaluation. 
Addendum E: Detail of referenced Marital Debt 
Addendum F: Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 
Addendum G: Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment. 
Addendum H: Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 
Addendum I: Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 
Addendum J: Petition for Divorce 
Addendum K: .Order on Objection 
Addendum L: Order on Order to Show Cause 
Addendum M: In Court Order on Order to Show Cause 
Addendum N: Petitioner's First set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents 
Addendum O: Ruling and Temporary Order 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Brighten Corp. v. Ward. 31 P.3d 594 (Utah App. 2001) 15 
Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) 16 
Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998) 5, 26 
Elman v. Elman. 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 2 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Svs.. Inc.. 866 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993) 1 
Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) 2, 16 
Liska v. Liska. 902 P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) 2 
Marshall v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996) 18 
Noble v. Noble. 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988) 2 
QNEIDA/SLIC v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 
1994) 17 
Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991) 26 
Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1995) 18 
Read v. Read. 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) 20,21, 22, 23 
Smith v. Smith. 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988) 17 
Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) 2, 25 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (2001X0 and (2) 26, 29 
iii 
IN Tl II. UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Ii7> I KICIA L.DAYTON, 
riaintni/Appellant 
DOUGLAS 1 *TON 
i Xlendani Appellee 
CaseNo.20010889-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appea: -p*n * / I T K I I I and decree of divorce. Second Disttki * '""it 
Judge iio^er S. *>ULSOI* uiiw.'iu *. - - . 
is 78. 200. . , 7 oi the findings oi l acts and 
Conclusions of Law is u- \ddendum \ ' : i ourt has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
CodeAnn. §78-2a-3(h)(l< >9 6] , 
SIArKMICNI OF 11 • li: ISSUES AND SI ANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues, 
I. 'Whether the trial court, inappropriately set aside a mutually assented to, on the 
record sdlltim/til ugivuncnl iqtiitll),' ill"", iilmi1 111* iii.iiiliil ussrls IHIVMTH (lir ^ppHliinl 
imd the Appellee? The decision of a trial court to enforce a settlement agreement will not 
be reversed on anneal ti.il* s^  " ^ hown that there was an abuse of discretion. 
Goodmansen v. Libt , 1 Wl ) . 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the Dayton marital 
estate awarding 91% of the marital assets to the Appellee and 9 % to the Appellant? The 
standard of review for evaluating a trial court's property valuation and division [in a 
divorce proceeding] is when such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman. 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (quoting Noble v. Noble, 
761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)). 
3. Whether the trial court unlawfully punished the Appellant for her inaccurate 
testimony by not dividing the marital assets equitably between the parties, awarding 91% 
of the marital assets to the Appellee? A question of law is reviewed under a correction of 
error standard, giving no deference to the trial court's determination. Liska v. Liska. 902 
P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) 
4. Whether the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were so 
inadequate as to not permit appellate review. "Findings are adequate only if they are 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah App. 1993)(quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988)). 
5. Whether the trial court should have awarded the Appellant attorney's fees given 
her financial need, the Appellee's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fee. "The decision to award attorneys fees rests in the sound discretion of the court and 
will only be disturbed for abuse of discretion." Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 
(Utah App. 1998). 
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S T A T E M E N T O F I H E C A S E 
P u t i n Ui II, I  l«i) (nil 11 it | i l . n n l i l l ill III! Il ] i i i i nil ml llii Apprll.'inl hefniv litis 
C o u r t will hereinafter be referred to as the Appellant. Douglas D. Dayton the ^._ _ ant 
in the lower court; and the Appellee in this case will here in after be referred to as the 
Appel.v*. .'-. .•• 'umesoi the transcupl w i n picpaiul in llus IMSC. HII1 llrsl > i Iliiiiiii 
the first day of trial held on January the 4, 2001 and hereinafter 
will be referred to as (Jan. K f he second volume i on\ tins the transcript of tht Iri I 
proceedings belli . - i<.biudi> *-*».. * . ebiudn .;- \-\; ^ • .. 
Petition I !nnc ^4„ ! 999 . 
^ee Addendum J. A three da> trial, regarding the di\ orce, started Jar 4. 20i»1 J a n . 
K II) The two subsequent days of litigation took place on February 26, J1101 „ ai id 
I cbruarj /'"K, J'lllll (I I. I I, M. • I i>,l ,lr, I (nil Vnpc: 11,*,i, 1 i I 
Appellee made an on the record selti V^iiii<iii u.£^i v v i i i w i l l regarding the distribution of the 
n Mil ital estate, leaving the issues of alimony and child support: to be litigated at a futi ire 
.1 1. 111 i. I! 11} \( (In Mail ill the s u i w d Li) i»l ln.il «»n I . I1" r * '"f". "N I (I, 
^ ppellee brought up the issi le as tc whether or not the January 4 JOOi on the record 
s zt tlement agreement was binding (Feb. R. 2) The trial court: concluded the settlement 
«^^^en t was not binding, (I -eb. R. 8,12) 
1
 1 lllliii, niiiin li is in in in Il liiiill nl I i' 11 in in J i ii'i, ''K "Midi, the trial ; mil in r Il-, llic mailer under 
MW.^W^WX. and thereafter issued a Ruling and Temporary Order on March 23, 2001, On 
\ ' II ?6. ^001 the Appellant filed a Motion To Alter or .Amend Judgment. See, 
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Addendum G. On August 22, 2001 the trial court denied the motion without giving any 
reasons for it's decision. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Divorce 
Decree were entered on September 28, 2001. See Addendum A. An appeal filed by the 
Appellant on November 5, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant and Appellee were married on June 5, 1982. See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P.2) During their eighteen year marriage Appellant and Appellee 
worked in the family concrete business. (Feb. R. 198-199) 
2. During the marriage, the Appellant and Appellee used the income from the 
family concrete business to provide for their family which included two teen-age sons. 
(Feb. R. 197) The Appellant and Appellee filed joint tax returns which included the 
assets from their family business. The parties did not file a separate tax return for the 
business. (Feb. R. 199). As a result of working in the family concrete business the 
Appellant and Appellee accumulated substantial assets. See Addendum A. (Findings of 
Fact P. 10) 
3. The Appellant and Appellee separated in June of 1999. (Jan. R. 91, 188). 
4. An Order on Order To Show Cause issued by the trial court on January 25, 
2000 required the Appellee to continue to make payments on the family bills including 
the house payment, utilities payments, and car payments for both the Appellant and the 
parties son. See Addendum L. An Order on Objection sign by the trial judge on March 
17, 2002 required the Appellee to bring house payments, utilities and the car payments 
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current within 15 day or to begin paying the Appellant $2,500 per month beginning the 
month of March 2000. See Addendum K. The court in an order to show cause hearing 
which was held on April 14, 2000 found the Appellee in contempt for failing to comply 
with previous court orders and sentence the Appellee to serve five days in the county jail. 
The Appellee was allowed to purge himself of contempt by paying $5,000 before April 
25, 2000. That order also restrained both parties from disposal of any of their assets 
without the prior written approval of the other party or a court order. See Addendum M. 
5. During the first day of trial, Appellant presented evidence of marital assets and 
liabilities through accountant, and expert witness, Roger Nuttle. (Feb. R. 1) Mr. Nuttle 
prepared Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, which comprised an accounting of the parties marital 
estate. (Jan. R. 10-11). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was entered into as evidence. (Jan. R. 67). 
Although this document was not completely un-controverted by the testimony of the 
Appellee, it was used by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(Findings of Fact P. 11, 17-18). 
6. The trial court also received testimony from the Appellant regarding her 
involvement in the dissipation of marital assets, namely some cement forms and a 
backhoe tractor that were located on the family property. (Jan. R. 244). The Appellant 
testified that she did not have any knowledge as to what happened to the backhoe. That it 
was removed from the property in March of 2000 when she was in California. (Jan. R. 
244). The Appellant also testified that her sons had taken some of the wood concrete 
forms located on the family property and brought them into the house to be burnt as fire 
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wood when the furnace was broken. (Jan. R. 247). 
7. Near the end of the first day of trial on January 4, 2001, Appellant and 
Appellee made an on the record settlement agreement regarding the distribution of the 
marital estate, leaving the issues of alimony and child support to be litigated at a future 
date. (Jan. R. 250). The settlement agreement was the Appellant would receive a three 
acre parcel of land (part of the marital estate) valued at approximately $60,000 dollars 
free and clear of any obligation secured by the property and a $25,000 lump sum 
payment. The Appellee would get all other marital property including the house, boat, 
sand rails (cars) and concrete business equipment. (Jan. R. 250). The trial court 
suggested that the stipulation be subject to both parties accounting for the properties that 
had been disposed of after the parties separation. (Jan. R. 237-238)8 The Appellant 
made it clear that this was a take it or leave it offer, and it was not to be conditioned 
whatsoever. (Jan. R. 249-50). The Appellee represented on the record that he agreed to 
the settlement agreement. (Jan. R. 250). 
8. At the beginning of the second day of trial on February 26, 2001 the Appellee 
brought up the issue as to whether or not the on the record settlement agreement, assented 
to by the Appellant and the Appellee on January 4, 2001, was binding because the 
appellant had disposed of the backhoe. (Feb. R.2) The trial court, over the objection of 
the Appellant, concluded the settlement agreement was not binding but gave no reason for 
its decision. (Feb. R. 8, 12) 
9. During trial on February 26, 2001 the Appellant testified that at the time of the 
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first hearing she had an idea as to what happened to the backhoe, but that she was not 
sure because she did not want to ask a certain person that question. (Feb. R.62) 
Appellant testified that after the first day of trial she became aware that one of her sons 
had sold the backhoe. (Feb. R.64, 244). The parties son Ryan testified that he had sold 
the backhoe in March 2000 for approximately $7,000 and used the money to fix up his 
truck that was broken and used the rest of money so that the family could survive and so 
that the Appellant could pay her attorney's fees. (Feb. R. 244-245). The Appellant also 
indicated that she, with the assistant of her son, had sold some metal concrete forms 
located on the family property but they had not been removed from the property prior to 
the first day of the trial which was in January 2001. (Feb. R.62-63). 
10. When the trial court set aside the stipulations of the parties, it encouraged the 
parties to engaged in additional negotiations for the purpose of reaching a settlement. In 
reference to the backhoe and concrete forms the trial court stated " . . . probably the key is 
a question as to values, rather than anything " (Feb. R. 4) The trial court also stated 
that a party may have been lying or not credible about some issues. The trial court than 
said " . . . [y]ou know, those aren't the issues: The real issues are when you get right 
down to balancing money, those are the things that are probably be the most important. 
Where are you going to come out in the end on a monetary basis. If you can set aside the 
emotions, and look at it that way maybe there is a way. I don't issue punitive judgements 
in divorce cases. I understand how emotional and how frustrating it is for both sides . . . " 
(Feb. R. 6) 
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11. The Appellee's deposition was take on April 7, 2000. In that deposition the 
Appellee stated that his construction company consisted solely on equipment he was 
leasing and services. He testified that he sold the business to his live-in girl friend 
because of the divorce proceedings with the Appellant. (Jan. R 197) The Appellee 
initially alleged that his girl friend had paid him $45,000 for the company but then 
admitted she had not paid him the $45,000. (Jan. R. 194-197) When asked if her name 
was on the business to avoid a division in the divorce proceedings the Appellee answered 
"correct". (Jan. R. 197) The Appellee testified that he had sold a Bobcat, a 24' flat bed 
trailer, a disco enclosed trailer, a sand rail, a 1994 truck trailer and forms, a 16f trailer and 
other items. The money received from these items was retained by the Appellee. 
(Deposition. 71-83). 
12. In the course of the trial the parties stipulated the home had an appraised 
valued at $175,000 and was subject to a first montage of $89,113 and a second montage 
in a sum of $45,231 resulting in a equity of $40,656. The parties own three acres of land 
which was appraised and the value was stipulated at $60,000 subject to a mortgage sum 
of $9,751.00 resulting in a equity of $50,249. The Appellant testified that business 
equipment assets, business furniture, and personal property acquired during the marriage 
as listed on Appellant's exhibit, (See Addendum B. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) represented a 
value of $199,833. The evidence views most favorably to the Appellee would support a 
value of $113,733. The only disputed property is the business equipment listed on 
Schedule B of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. (See Schedule B Property Evaluation Attached 
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hereto as Addendum D). The indebtedness of the parties not related to the real property 
amounted to a total $143,987. 
13. The Trial court made no finding of fact as to the value of the assets or the 
amount of indebtedness. 
14. After the trial, Judge Dutson entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. See Addendum A. In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court 
characterized the Appellants trial testimony as 6<the most problematic issue in this case." 
(Findings of Fact P. 5). The trial court identifies the Appellant as one who "intentionally 
attempted to mislead the [c]ourt... relating primarily to personal property she sold or 
disposed of intentionally or that has disappeared while in her possession." See 
Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 5) The trial court also indicated that it 46will not 
reward the [Appellant] for her deceptions in regards to property she has sold, disposed of 
and lied about." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 10) 
15. Also included in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law is 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, specifically schedules A, B and C. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is the only 
evidence used in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to identify the property 
constituting the marital estate. It is also used to describe how to divide the marital assets 
and debts. See Addendum B. (Findings of Fact P. 10-11, 17-18) In the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ordered the Appellee to sell a substantial portion 
of the marital assets, including the family home, three acres of land, and two sand rails 
(cars) and accompanying trailers, in order to pay down the marital debt. See Addendum 
9 
A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Following the sale of these marital assets, if there 
remained any outstanding marital debt, the Appellee was ordered to sell the boat and 
motor home to finish paying off all existing marital debt. See Addendum A. (Findings 
of Fact P. 11-12, 19) After all the marital debt was paid, the court awarded all surplus 
money or listed assets not needed to be sold, to the Appellee. See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P. 12, 19) Additionally, all business related assets listed on schedule A 
and B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 were awarded to the Appellee (respondent). See Addendum 
A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Moreover, the Appellee was awarded several household 
items listed on Schedule C of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact 
P. 11,17-18) 
16. The trial court awarded the Appellant the remaining house hold furnishings 
listed on Schedule C of Plaintiff s Exhibit land a 1995 Mitsubishi vehicle with its 
accompanying debt. See Addendum A. (Findings of Facts P. 11, 17) 
17. The Order to Show Cause of January 25, 2000 required the parties exchange 
financial information. See Addendum L. The subsequent Order to Show Cause of March 
17, 2000 required the parties to exchange information including the 1999 financial 
records within 15 days. See Addendum M. The Appellant submitted written 
interrogatories and requests for production document to the Appellee on November 14, 
2000 requiring, among other things, the Appellee's financial records. See Addendum N. 
Despite the court's order and the discovery request, the Appellee did not produce his 
financial records. The Appellant retained the services of an accountant, Roger Nuttle 
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who produced Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 and Plaintiffs Exhibit4 ( See 
Addendums B, H and I) from records the Appellant was able to provide. The Appellee 
claimed that he had little or no income to pay indebtedness or to pay child support and 
alimony. The court, as a result of the efforts of the Appellant and her accountant, found 
that the Appellee's annual income was $70,000-$75,000 per year or approximately 
$6,000 per month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 7) The court also found that 
information provided by the Appellant that her monthly income was $1,316 dollars per 
month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 6) The trial court would not have been 
able to determine the Appellee's income or to establish alimony or child support without 
the efforts of the Appellant's accountant and attorney. 
18. The Appellant during the course of the trial presented evidence as to her 
Attorney fees, her income and needs and the Appellee's income. In the trial courts 
written decision and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled 
that each party had to pay it's own attorney's fees and court costs. See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P. 13) See Addendum O. (Ruling and Temporary Order P. 8) The trial 
court made no findings as to why it was denying the Appellant request for attorney fees 
and court costs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court divided the marital assets in a grossly disproportionate manner. 
The trial court awarded the Appellee 91% of the marital assets and only 9% to the 
Appellant. Such a disparate deviation from the presumption of a 50%-50% split of all 
11 
marital assets upon divorce is an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
The trial court inappropriately punished the Appellant when it awarded the 
Appellee 91% of the marital assets for Appellants in accurate testimony. Evidence of 
such testimony can only be used to discredit Appellant, and thus it goes to the weight of 
the Appellants evidence. Inaccurate testimony, or even purposeful deception does not 
give the trial court the authority to issue a punitive division of the marital assets. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law are inadequate for a 
proper review. The trial court is required to make specific findings and establish a basis 
for it decision regarding the division of marital assets. The trial court's findings did not 
include specific values to each of the marital assets. The findings did not indicate what 
means it use to determine the value of each award to the parties. The trial courts findings 
were insufficient to justify it's division of the marital assets. 
The trial court inappropriately set aside an on the record settlement agreement 
between the parties. The Appellant offered the exact terms of the agreement while on the 
record before the court. The Appellant made it clear that the offer was an unconditioned 
'take it or leave it offer." Both parties assented to the settlement agreement on the 
record. Subsequently the trial court summarily set the agreement aside giving no legal 
bases for it's decision. 
The trial court inappropriately did not award the Appellant attorneys fees and 
costs. The Appellant was in substantial financial need, and the Appellee was in a 
financial position to pay for the Appellant's fees. Additionally, the trial court did not 
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make any findings whatsoever regarding the denial of attorneys as it is obligated to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
SET ASIDE A MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO ON THE RECORD 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EQUALLY DIVIDING THE MARITAL 
ASSETS. 
At the end of the first day of trial on January 4, 2001, the Appellant and the 
Appellee came to a stipulation regarding the division of marital property. The agreement 
was that the Appellant would receive the three acre parcel of land free and clear of 
encumbrances valued at $60,000 and received a $25,000 lump sum payment from the 
Appellee. (Jan. R. 235) The Appellant would receive all other marital property, pay the 
debts, and the Appellant would not pursue attorneys fees and accounting fees. (Jan. R. 
235) 
At the time these terms were presented before the trial court, Judge Dutson 
attempted to condition the agreement by requiring that both parties fully disclose all 
information regarding the dissipation of assets. (Jan. R. 237) Judge Dutson also 
attempted to condition the agreement on both parties protection of the marital assets. 
(Jan. R. 237) Finally, Judge Dutson attempted to condition the agreement by requiring 
that if any thing was sold it must be accounted for and applied to the stipulation. (Jan. R. 
238) 
The Appellant then stated before the trial court that it was not agreeing to any of 
the conditions j a^ced by Judge Dutson. Counsel for the Appellant stated "[b]ut we did 
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not submit it on the basis that it could still be before the court. We did it on the basis that 
the only issue before Your Honor, was the alimony and child support. That was a 
specific stipulation." (Jan. R. 242) The Appellant made it clear that this was a take it or 
leave it offer, and it was not to be conditioned whatsoever. (Jan. R. 249-50). 
Judge Dutson then required the Appellant to testify as to her dissipation of any 
marital assets. (Jan. R. 243) Whereupon the Appellant testified that she had not sold any 
marital assets. (Jan. R. 244) The Appellant then reiterated that the deal being offered by 
the Appellant was the deal as previously stated by counsel, not condition on any other 
provision. (Jan. R. 250) Judge Dutson then asked the Appellee and Appellant if they 
agreed to this stipulation, and both parties answered "yes> sir." (Jan. R. 250) Judge 
Dutson then ordered counsel for the Appellant to prepare the order. (Jan. R. 250) 
On February 26, 2001, the second day of trial, the Appellee questioned the trial 
court as to whether or not there was a binding settlement agreement. (Feb. R. 2) At that 
time, the Appellee proffered to the trial court that he believed that the Appellant had 
withheld information regarding the dissipation of marital assets, namely the backhoe 
tractor. 
The trial court, over the objection of the Appellant, set aside the stipulations of the 
parties. (Feb. R. 8) However, immediately prior to setting it aside the trial court 
encouraged the parties to engaged in additional negotiations for the purpose of reaching a 
settlement. In reference to the backhoe and concrete forms the trial court stated " . . . 
probably the key is a question as to values, rather than anything...." (Feb. R. 4) The 
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trial court also stated that a party may have been lying or not credible about some issues. 
The trial court than said " . . . [y]ou know, those aren't the issues: The real issues are 
when you get right down to balancing money, those are the things that are probably be 
the most important. Where are you going to come out in the end on a monetary basis.95 
At which point the parties were not able to reach an agreement, and the agreement was 
set aside. (Feb. R. 8) 
Rule 4-504(7) of the Code of Judicial Administration (2001) allows a trial court to 
enter an order based on stipulation if the stipulation was made on the record. It is clear 
that at the end of the first day of trial both the Appellant and Appellee assented to the 
unconditioned settlement agreement. (Jan. R. 250) At the beginning of the second day of 
trial, the trial court set the settlement aside without articulating any legal basis for setting 
it aside. The enforceability of a settlement agreement is governed by state contract law. 
Brighten Corp. v. Ward. 31 P.3d 594, 598 (Utah App. 2001). As such, it was incumbent 
on the moving party, the Appellee, to articulate before the trial court any legal basis to set 
aside the settlement. No such legal basis were presented. Rather, the trial court 
summarily set the settlement aside based on a proffer by Counsel for the Appellee. This 
effectively denied the Appellant any opportunity to argue against any of the potential 
legal basis that would justify setting aside an otherwise enforceable settlement. 
Moreover, the trial court made no findings that justified his setting aside the settlement 
agreement. 
Assuming arguendo that his justifications were based on his proposed contingent 
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provision, requiring complete disclosure of any dissipated marital assets, according to 
Judge Dutsons own provisions, any non-disclosure would only modify the agreement, or 
be applied to the stipulation. It would not be grounds to set the whole settlement aside. 
(Jan. R. 238) In this case, the reason the trial court set aside the whole agreement was 
due to the alleged non-disclosed sale of a backhoe tractor for $7,000. Thus, at most, 
Judge Dutson should have adjusted the settlement agreement by $7,000 in favor of the 
Appellee. Without any other legal justification, Judge Dutson did not have the authority 
to set aside the entire settlement. 
Therefore, this Court should overrule the order of the trial court setting aside the 
settlement agreement, and uphold the settlement agreement. 
II THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
DIVIDED THE DAYTON MARITAL ESTATE IN A GROSSLY 
DISPROPORTIONATE MANNER. 
In Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993), this Court recognized that 
4<trial courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a fair and 
systematic fashion." In a divorce action "each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty 
percent of the marital property." Id (quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 
App. 1990). The law presumes that marital assets will be shared equally between the 
parties. Id. 
The Appellant an Appellee were married for eighteen years. During their marriage 
the they developed a family concrete business. All of the family and business assets 
were co-mingled and subsequently dispensed as needed by the family or by the business. 
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It was never intended by either party that there be any distinction between business and 
family assets. Both parties used business accounts to benefit the family, and used family 
property (or the equity in the family property) to benefit the business. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court utilizes a trial 
exhibit, identified as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, to describe the nature of the various marital 
assets. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 17). Many of the values attached to 
marital assets listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 are undisputed by the Appellee. This Court 
has upheld the trial courts discretion to base property valuations solely on evidence 
presented by one spouse, where the other spouse failed to present contrary evidence. 
Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Appellee did present contradictory testimony regarding the value of some of 
the of the assets listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See infra. The trial court 
did not make any specific findings regarding the value of the various assets in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Judge Dutson only identified what assets were 
to be awarded to each party. 
When challenging a trial courts findings of fact, the appellate party must play 
"devils advocate" and extract all evidence that purports to support the trial courts 
findings. ONEIDA/SLIC v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1053-53 (Utah App. 1994). The appellant must marshal all the evidence that would 
support a finding that the division of the marital estate was not disproportionate, "and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in question." 
17 
Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Phillips v. Hatfield, 
904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995)). 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court awarded the 
Appellant all the household items as listed on Schedule C of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, less 
"one big screen television, the ceramic kiln, all the guns and rifles, and camping and 
outdoor gear and accessories." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) The 
value of the Appellant's awarded household items listed on Schedule C totaled $4,390 
and was not contested by the Appellee. See Addendum B. The trial court also awarded 
the Appellant "the Mitsubishi automobile, plus the obligation to pay thereon." See 
Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 17) The value of the Mitsubishi automobile, less 
the outstanding obligation, was $7,200. See Addendum B. Thus, the Appellant's total 
award of the marital estate was $11,590. 
Also included in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law was the award of 
marital property to the Appellee. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 12, 18) The 
Appellee was awarded the marital home valued at $175,0001 and a three acre parcel of 
land valued $60,0002. The Appellee was also awarded two sand rails, and accompanying 
trailers, valued by the Appellee at $18,000. (Feb. R. 219) The Appellee was awarded a 
boat valued at $15,500, and a motor home valued at $67,980 See Addendum B. 
]The appraised value of the home was indicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 and stipulated to by 
the Appellee. See Addendum C. (Jan. R. 12-13) 
2The appraised value of the three acre parcel was indicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 and 
stipulated to by the Appellee. See Addendum C. (Jan. R.12-13) 
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The Appellee was also awarded all the property listed on Schedule A of Plaintiffs 
Exhibit i. See addendum B. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Schedule A 
was created by Roger Nuttle, accountant and expert witness. Mr. Nuttle created this 
document with ini mation provided by the Appellant. (Jan. R. 15-16) The total value of 
the marital assets listed on Schedule A was $646. The value of each item was estimated 
by the Appellant, and was not contested by the Appellee. 
The trial court also awarded the Appellee all the property listed on Schedule B of 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum B. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) 
Schedule B was also created by Roger Nuttle with information provided by the Appellant. 
(Jan. R. 16-17) Many of the values attached to the various assets listed on Schedule B 
were based on the estimates of the Appellant. (Jan. R.16-17) Additional information 
regarding some of the values attached to the assets listed on Schedule B were compiled 
by Mr. Nuttle through the deposition testimony of the Appellee. (Jan. R.16-17) The 
Appellee also testified at trial regarding many of the estimated property values indicted 
on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 indicates a total value of $151,800 for the assets listed on 
Schedule B. See Addendum B. Marshaling the testimonial evidence (in regards to the 
value of the property listed on Schedule B) in an attempt to support the trial court's 
division of the marital estate as not being grossly disproportionate, results in a total value 
of $65,700 for the assets listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See Addendum D. 
Appellee was also awarded the guns and rifles a ceramic kiln and a big screen TV 
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as listed on Schedule C of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum A. (Findings of Facts 
11,17-18) See Addendum B. The total value of these items as indicted on Schedule C is 
$2,100 which was not contested by the Appellee. Marshaling the evidence in the most 
favorable light to support the trial court's decision, the combined value of all the marital 
assets awarded to the Appellee is $404,926. 
In connection with the awarded property to the Appellee the trial judge ordered the 
Appellee to sell the marital home, three acre parcel, and the two sand rails to pay off all 
existing mortgages and liens on all marital property, taxes owed to the Internal Revenue 
Service and any other referenced marital debt. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 
11, 18) If the foregoing sales of those previously listed assets were not sufficient to pay 
all of the above mentioned marital debt, the boat and the motor home were to be sold. 
All remaining assets or property was awarded to the Appellee. See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P. 11-12, 18-19) The total measure of referenced family and business 
debt, including all mortgages, liens and back taxes is $290,082. See Addendum E. 
Subtracting the combined total family debt of $290,082 from the Appellee's total award 
of $404,926 leaves the Appellee with a total award of $114,844. Comparing that to the 
$11,590 awarded to the Appellant, the percentage of the marital estate awarded to the 
Appellant is approximately 9% while the award to the Appellee is approximately 91%. 
In Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), the Appellant was only awarded 10% 
of the marital estate while the Appellee was awarded 90%. Id. at 872. In that case the 
Utah Supreme Court indicted that when a marriage has failed it is the trial courts duty to 
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consider various factors in order to arrange the best allocation of the property and 
economic resources so the parties can resume there life in as happy and useful a manner 
as possible. Id. The court went on to say that when the division of property is so 
discordant with an equitable allocation that it will more likely lead to further difficulties 
and distress a reappraisal of the division must be undertaken. Id. The Court went on to 
conclude that the 90% to 10% split was far to disparate and required that the decree 
division be modified. Id. 
Like the facts in Read, the Appellee in this case has been awarded 91%, virtually 
all, of the marital property which both parties used and enjoyed prior to their divorce. 
The Appellant has effectively been left with no assets to show for her eighteen years of 
work and economic input into the family concrete business. On the other hand, the 
Appellee was awarded more then enough property to pay for the marital debts and 
received all the work related equipment to further his new business ventures. The trial 
court's decree is clearly in discordance with the notion of equitable division of marital 
property. When a 50%-50% division among the parties is presumably the proper division 
upon divorce, a 91% to 9% division of a marital is unjustifiable in almost any 
circumstance. Certainly there are no such circumstances in this case. 
Additionally, had the Appellants value estimates of marital property been used by 
the trial court, (not an irrational conclusion considering the heavy reliance on the 
Appellants exhibits and expert witnesses) the Appellee's marital award would be 
increased by an additional $86,100 for a total of $491,026. See Addendum D. Leaving 
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the Appellee a total award, after paying all marital debts, of $200,944, increasing the 
margin of disparity between the awards of the Appellant and Appellee to 5Vi % of the 
marital estate being awarded to the Appellant and 94lA % being awarded to the Appellee. 
Therefore, the trial courts division of the marital estate in favor of the Appellee is 
grossly disproportionate. 
Ill THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
PUNISHED THE APPELLANT BY AWARDING HER ONLY 9% OF THE 
MARITAL ASSETS. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court Judge Dutson stated 
'the Court will not reward the Petitioner [Appellant] for her deceptions in regards to 
property she has sold, disposed of and lied about." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact 
P. 10) Judge Dutson also stated "[t]he Court will, to some degree, resolve the problems 
with her deception on the property division and debt payment, in that it was in these areas 
that she lied." Id. Subsequent to these statements, Judge Dutson went on and divided the 
marital estate 91% in favor of the Appellee, leaving only 9% to the Appellant. See supra. 
In Read, 594 P.2d at 872, the Appellant argued that he was only awarded 10% of 
the marital assets because the trial court intentionally punished him for the break up of his 
marriage. Id. The Utah Supreme Court stated "[a] trial court must consider many factors 
in making a property settlement in a divorce proceeding, but the purpose of the settlement 
should not be to impose punishment upon either party." Id. at 872. The Read Court went 
on to indicate "there is no authority in our law for administering punitive measures in a 
divorce judgment, and to do so would be improper " Id. 
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In this case Judge Dutson clearly believed that the Appellant lied to the court 
during her testimony at trail regarding the dissipation of marital assets, namely some 
concrete forms and a backhoe tractor. (Jan. R. 244, Feb. R. 62) See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P. 10) Based on such a finding Judge Dutson could have used that 
information to weight the credibility of the Appellant's evidence. However, Judge 
Dutson could not use that evidence to divide the marital assets in a punitive manner. Id. 
Judge Dutson made no findings as to how the Appellants perceived inaccurate 
testimony affected any valuation of the marital estate. To the contrary, the only evidence 
used to support Judge Dutson's assessment and division of the marital assets was 
Appellant's exhibit at trial, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. See Addendum B. The only reasonable 
conclusion for why he used this evidence is it was the most creditable evidence presented 
at trail. 
Judge Dutson's decision to punish the Appellant for her "deceptions 
on the property division," by awarding the Appellee 91% of the marital assets, instead of 
using it to weigh the credibility of her testimony, was an abuse of his authority. A trial 
court judge has no authority to administer punitive measures in a divorce judgment. 
Read, 594 P.2d at 872. 
Therefore, Judge Dutson's punitive award of 9% of the marital assets to the 
Appellant is improper. 
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IV THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DID NOT ASSIGN 
VALUES TO EACH ITEM OF DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY. 
The trial court did not make adequate findings in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. See Addendum A. In his findings the trial court distributes and 
awards various martial assets almost exclusively based on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and, 
impliedly on Plaintiffs Exhibit 10. See Addendums B and F. (Findings of Facts P. 17-
19) The values indicted on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 are largely uncontested, with the 
exception of items listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 (hereinafter Schedule B). 
The nature and value of the items identified on Schedule B were disputed between 
Appellant and Appellee. See Addendum D. The parties estimates of the total value of 
the marital assets listed on Schedule B differed by $86,100. See Addendum D. 
The trial court's Findings of fact and conclusions of Law failed to identify whether 
or not the values provided in Plaintiffs Exhibit lwere in fact the values as determined by 
the trial court. Even more problematic is the lack of any trial court findings regarding 
the value of the items listed on Schedule B. Assuming arguendo that Judge Dutson 
intended to use all the values as provided by Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, The Appellee's marital 
award of $404,926 (the figure used in Argument II after marshaling the evidence to 
support the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) would be increased by an 
additional $86,100 for a total of $491,026. Leaving the Appellee a total award, after 
paying all marital debts, of $200,944, increasing the margin of disparity between the 
awards of the Appellant and Appellee to 5]/2 % of the marital estate being awarded to the 
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Appellant and 94lA % being awarded to the Appellee. 
In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) the trial court faced a 
situation where the value of the marital assets was sharply disputed. Id. at 955. "[I]n its 
memorandum decision and findings of fact, the trial court did not: (a) identify the items 
of marital property and debt; and (b) assign values to each item of marital property and 
debt or a total value to the cumulative share awarded to each party." Id. This Court went 
on to conclude "we cannot perform our reviewing function and determine whether the 
parties' property was equitably distributed without the trial court's detailed identification 
and valuation of the assets and debts awarded to each party." Id. 
Like the facts in Stevens, the trial court failed to provided a detailed valuation of 
the assets listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum A (Findings of Fact P. 17-19) 
As such, it is impossible to determine how much of the marital estate the Appellant and 
Appellee actually received. Value determinations are required for an equitable division 
of properly. Id. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the judgement as to the property division, 
remand for further factual findings and require the trial court to equtiably divide the 
marital assets. 
V THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
DID NOT AWARD THE APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FEES AND COURT 
COSTS. 
In the trial courts Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it concluded that each 
party waw responsible for it's own attorneys fees and costs. See Addendum A. 
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(Findings of Facts P. 13). Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(1) (2001) codifies a trial court's 
discretion to award attorneys fees, costs and expert witness fees in divorce actions to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend an action. Codification of such discretion to 
award fees was intended to allow divorce litigants a broader award of reimbursement than 
those authorized in other civil cases. Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 
1991). A trial courts broad discretion to award attorneys fees "must be based on evidence 
of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App. 
1998). The Appellant and Appellee's circumstances fit the criteria for awarding attorneys 
fees and costs to the Appellant. 
A. The Appellant Has Substantial Financial Need to Justify Awarding 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, 
In the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the court found the 
Appellant's monthly income to be $1,316 dollars per month. See Addendum A. 
(Findings of Fact P. 6) Compounding the Appellants financial need, the trial court only 
awarded the Appellant 9% if all the marital assets. The Appellant did received some 
furniture, and her vehicle with its accompanying debt, but these assets are clearly 
inadequate to aid the Appellant and her financial need and could not be used to offset the 
cost of litigation. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11) 
The Appellant also incurred substantial costs in hiring an accountant to compile 
the financial documentation used to support the trial courts findings. Without this 
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information the trial court would not have been able to determine the Appellee's income 
or to establish alimony or child support. The Appellee did not aid the trial court 
whatsoever in producing information for the trial court to rely on. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not make any findings as to what it based it's 
decision on in not awarding attorneys fees and costs. Given the facts that the Appellant 
had no significant income, received no substantial assets in the property division, and the 
trial court made no findings as to why it did not award any attorney's fees or costs, 
suggests the courts intentions to further punish the Appellant for her "deceptions." It is 
clear that the Appellant's financial need justifies an award of attorneys fees. 
B. The Appellee Has Substantial Assets to Pay for Appellants Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, 
During the course of litigation, the Appellee was uncooperative in supplying his 
financial records. The Appellee did not produce any significant evidence through 
testimony, or any other means, to aid the court in it's valuation of income. Additionally, 
the Appellee attempted to hide assets by selling his business to his live-in girlfriend. 
(Jan. R. 194-97) 
Through the efforts of Appellant's counsel and accountant, the trial court was able 
to determined the Appellee's annual income of $70,000-$75,000 per year or 
approximately $6,000 per month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 7) In addition 
to the Appellee's substantial income, the Appellee was awarded approximately $114,000 
worth of assets in the property division. See Supra. It is clear that the Appellee has the 
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ability to pay for the Appellants attorney's fees and costs. 
C. The Trial Court Failed to Make Any Determination on the 
Reasonableness of Attorneys Fees and Costs, 
During the first day of trial Appellant offered Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, which 
consisted of an itemized list of attorneys fees. The exhibit was accepted by the trial court 
without objection. (Jan. R. 174-75) During the second day of trial counsel for the 
Appellant requested an opportunity to proffer regarding attorneys fees. (Feb. R. 257) The 
trial court rejected counsels request and indicted that the court would accept affidavits on 
attorneys fees. (Feb. R. 257) Subsequent to Judge Dutson's oral obligation to accept 
affidavits regarding attorneys fees and costs, the trial court summarily denied counsel the 
opportunity to submit an affidavit regarding attorneys fees and costs when it denied 
attorneys fees and costs in it's written decision and in it's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 13) 
The trial court's denial of attorneys fees and costs was not supported by any 
findings. Specifically, there was no basis or any reason given as to whether or not the 
submitted fees were reasonable nor did the trial court address any of the required 
elements regarding the awarding of attorneys fees and costs. Based on these facts, the 
trial court was obligated to make a findings in support of it's decision to not award 
attorneys fees and costs. 
D. The Appellant should be awarded attorneys fees because she prevailed 
on the issues of child custody, child support and alimony. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2)(2001) codifies a trial courts discretion to award 
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attorneys fees and costs in divorce actions upon a determination that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. If a party substantially prevails or 
defends, the trial court, upon its discretion, may award fees, limited fees, or no fees upon 
a finding that the party is impecunious, or enters in the record the reasons for not 
awarding fees. 
Appellant was awarded custody of the parties two minor children. See Addendum 
A. (Findings of Fact P. 2) Appellant was awarded child support of $487.08 for each of 
the two minor children. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 2) Appellant was 
awarded $1,200 per month in Alimony. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 13) 
Based on these facts, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) mandates that the trial court make 
specific findings as to whether or not it is awarding attorneys fees and costs, and on what 
basis it is making it's decision. The trial court made no such findings. 
Based on the findings that the Appellee's annual income ia approximately $6,000 
a month it is unlikely that the trial court could then characterize Appellee as impecunious. 
As such, the trial court is required to make specific findings supporting it's decision to 
not award attorney's fees. The trial court made no such findings. Rather, the trial court 
summarily denied the Appellant any award of attorneys fees and costs. See Addendum 
A. (Findings of Fact P. 13) 
Therefore, this Court should remand the issue of attorneys fees and costs back to 
the trial court, and require the trial court to make further findings as to the awarding of 
attorneys fees. 
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Conclusion 
The trial court inappropriately set aside the on the record settlement agreement between 
the parties. The Appellant offered the exact terms of the agreement while on the record 
before the court. The Appellant made it clear that the offer was an unconditioned 'take it 
or leave it offer," and both parties assented to the settlement agreement. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the trial courts decision to set aside the 
agreement, and find the settlement agreement binding. 
The trial court division of the marital assets in a 91%- 9% split of the marital 
assets in favor of the Appellee is grossly disproportionate and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. In this case, it is also clearly intended to be punitive. 
Therefore, this Court should enter its own ruling based on upon the evidence 
presented at trial. Alternatively, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, 
and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions requiring the trial court to not be 
punitive in it's division of the marital assets, and to make an equitable distribution of the 
assets supported by sufficient findings. 
The trial court inappropriately did not award the Appellant attorneys fees and 
costs. The Appellant was in substantial financial need, and the Appellee was in a 
financial position to pay for the Appellant's fees. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial courts decision not awarding 
attorneys fees and costs, and remand the issue back to the trial court with instruction to 
consider the relevant position of the parties, and to support its decision with sufficient 
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findings. 
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